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Abstract.  As the world’s urban poor increase in numbers, they become acutely vulnerable to 27 
hazards from extreme weather events.  On November 8, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan struck the province 28 
of Leyte, Philippines, with casualties numbering in the thousands, largely due to the ensuing storm 29 
surge that swept the coastal communities.  We investigate the role and dynamics of risk 30 
communication in these events, specifically examining the organizational processing of text within 31 
a complex institutional milieu.  We show how the risk communication process failed to convey 32 
meaningful information about the predicted storm surge, transmitting and retransmitting the same 33 
routine text instead of communicating authentic messages in earnest.  The key insight is that, rather 34 
than focus solely on the verbatim transmission of a scripted text, risk communication needs to 35 
employ various modes of translation and feedback signals across organizational and institutional 36 
boundaries. Adaptation will require overcoming organizational rigidities in order to craft 37 
proportionate responses to extreme weather events that may lie outside personal and institutional 38 
memory.   Future work should build upon the textual processing model of risk communication.  39 
 40 
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 45 
Introduction.  46 
Typhoons and attendant storm surges can be predicted days in advance of their onset.  But how 47 
should we conceptualize the concomitant risk communication process for extreme weather events?  48 
Is it most properly understood as the routinized transmission of parcels of information from sender 49 
to receiver along a chain of communication?  Or should it be a more active and dynamic exchange, 50 
where a variety of narrators tell the story in different ways, interpreting it according to who the 51 
speakers and listeners are?  As our investigation surrounding Typhoon Haiyan suggests, these 52 
questions are among the most urgent and consequential for reducing the impacts of extreme 53 
weather on society.  54 
 55 
The Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that, attendant to anthropogenic 56 
influences on global climate, there may be more frequent extreme daily minimum and maximum 57 
temperatures, intensification of extreme precipitation, and increasing coastal high water (IPCC, 58 
2012)1. IPCC reports note with high confidence that areas of urban and low-lying coastal zones 59 
are at the most risk of severe harm and loss from climate change-related hazards (Oppenheimer et 60 
al., 2014). Increasingly, communities may undergo extreme weather-related events (e.g., floods) 61 
of magnitudes that the local population has never before experienced (Peduzzi et al., 2009; 62 
Thomas, Albert, & Hepburn, 2014).  Thus, development of effective strategies for adaptation to 63 
and communication of these intensifying extreme events is becoming ever more important. The 64 
transition from knowledge to action is aided by experiential processing, which requires linking 65 
                                                 
1
  The extant evidence on increasing tropical cyclone intensity is most reliable for the Norh 
Atlantic (Grossman and Morgan, 2011; Schiermeier, 2013), and some evidence that this may 
possibly hold for other ocean areas as well (Emmanuel, 2013).  
 4 
climate and weather forecast communication to personal and collective memory (Colten and 66 
Sumpter, 2008; Akerlof et al., 2013; Hall and Endfield, 2015).  Yet sometimes the nature or the 67 
magnitude of an extreme weather event lies outside the personal and institutional memories of the 68 
affected populace, or only in distant memory (Gaillard et al., 2004; Howe et al., 2014).  Especially 69 
when unusually extreme events like these are expected, communication of their prediction must 70 
be delivered with reference to specific context and recommendations for action.    71 
 72 
On November 8, 2013, Central Philippines encountered one of the strongest tropical cyclones to 73 
make landfall in recorded history (Schiermeier, 2013; Normile, 2014). Notwithstanding forecasts 74 
that warned of wind speeds around 300 kph and a 7 meter storm surge, the devastation was 75 
extensive, particularly in Tacloban City in Leyte province, which lay right in the path of the 76 
typhoon (see Figure 1) and where most of the fatalities were due to the storm surge.2  Intensity 77 
estimates derived from satellite data just before landfall revealed a maximum 1-minute sustained 78 
wind speed of 315 kph, which is a Category 5 on the Saffir–Simpson Scale (Daniell et al., 2013). 79 
Post-event field measurements in Leyte revealed storm surge heights of 4 to 8 meters with an 80 
average inundation height of approximately 6 m (Mas et al., 2014), proving the surge model 81 
prediction to be reasonably accurate. Tacloban City, in particular, exhibits the confluence of social 82 
and physical vulnerability described in the hazard-of-place literature (Cutter et al., 2009). The area 83 
features a shallow coastal bathymetry that is conducive to storm surge (Soria et al., 2016) 84 
                                                 
2  A final count was never achieved, though the government’s official estimate is around 6,300 
(NDRRMC, 2014), a figure that has been disputed by different sources (Esmaquel, 2013; Avila, 
2014; IBTA, 2014).  
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combined with poverty and makeshift or substandard housing3.  The people and officials in 85 
Tacloban should have been ready, yet even the mayor of Tacloban and his family were caught by, 86 
and nearly perished in, the storm surge in their beachfront homes (Salaverria, 2013). The national 87 
agency’s weather monitoring team in Tacloban misinterpreted the storm surge warning and was 88 
caught by the surge in their seaside office, resulting in a team member’s death (Flores, 2013). 89 
 90 
[ Insert Figure 1 around here. ] 91 
 92 
One wonders, then, why the reasonably accurate forecasting would not lead to effective risk 93 
prevention on the ground?  Ex post evaluations suggested many factors to have contributed to the 94 
devastating impact of Typhoon Haiyan, but one theme stood out, in particular: the way risks of 95 
storm surge were communicated (Rasquinho, 2014; GIZ, 2014).  In the words of one of the 96 
managers in the national weather service, "It's more on the signals and in delivering the forecasts 97 
and warning distributed to the public. But the storm surge wasn't explained there".4  These and 98 
other anecdotal reports implicate risk communication during Typhoon Haiyan as an important 99 
object for inquiry.  100 
 101 
Since organizational factors have been implicated in risk communication failures in the past 102 
(Freudenburg, 2003; Cole and Fellows, 2008), especially concerning large-scale tropical cyclones 103 
                                                 
3  Tacloban has a population of 221,174, as of the 2010 Census, and is growing at 2.16% per 
year. Only 43.4% of the housing in the municipality is of standard (concrete) construction. 
Source: http://web0.psa.gov.ph/content/population-tacloban-city-rose-more-200-thousand-
results-2010-census-population-and-housing   (downloaded December 8, 2014).  
4   http://www.rappler.com/move-ph/issues/disasters/typhoon-yolanda/43735-yolandaph-haiyan-
preparedness-philippines  (accessed May 22, 2016).  
 6 
and tsunamis, events such Hurricane Katrina and others (Marris, 2005; Cole & Fellows, 2008), our 104 
work highlights the risk communication process as it is carried out within a complex organizational 105 
structure. We focus most closely on the aspect of institutional translation of risk signals, both 106 
within and across organizations.  Using the case study of Typhoon Haiyan as an example, we 107 
investigate the influence that methods for communicating risk information about an extreme, non-108 
routine weather event have on the response of the population at risk.  The Philippines presents an 109 
appropriate context for such an investigation, as faulty communication of hazards such as volcano 110 
eruptions and typhoons have been implicated in a number of disasters in this country in the past 111 
(e.g., Leone and Gaillard, 1999).  Recent IPCC reports highlight how tropical coasts and islands 112 
are extremely vulnerable in terms of geographic location and response capacity with insufficient 113 
government attention on disaster risk reduction (Oppenheimer et al., 2014; Nurse, et al., 2014). 114 
Our research highlights the need to reflect critically on the role of organizational routines and inter-115 
organizational processes in risk communication, and the importance of developing effective 116 
communication in order to avoid the unnecessary losses experienced during Typhoon Haiyan.  117 
 118 
The idea of adaptation suggests the identification and implementation of measures to respond to 119 
risks of extreme events, looking backward at a region's history of such events, as well as forward, 120 
trying to discern new emerging patterns of risk and vulnerability. Historically, the Philippines 121 
receives more tropical storms than any other country except for China5, so there is a great 122 
awareness regarding typhoons among Filipinos.  However, the agencies and the population pay 123 
most attention to risks from the high wind speeds and rainfall, more so than storm surges.  In fact, 124 
there are records that a similarly devastating storm surge occurred in Tacloban City in the past 125 
                                                 
5  http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/E25.html  
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(Soria et al. 2016). But these infrequent events can be lost from the institutional and personal 126 
memories of a region --in the case of Tacloban City, the said storm surge occurred in 1897 (Algué, 127 
1989).  Soria et al. recount how residents of Samar and Leyte described their precautionary 128 
measures prior to Typhoon Haiyan's arrival were guided mainly by their experience of lesser 129 
typhoons (Soria et al., 2016).  Moreover, prior to Haiyan, the most cataclysmic weather event in 130 
the region was the Ormoc City flood during Tropical Storm Thelma in 1991, but the flooding was 131 
due to the excessive rainfall and mud slides, not storm surge (Mahmud, 2000). Adaptation also 132 
requires anticipating and preparing for events that have never been experienced by a region's 133 
residents.  As Soria et al. ask: "How does the experience of smaller, relatively less impactful events 134 
shape the response of the community to larger, unprecedented events or those with return periods 135 
outside the living memory of residents?" (Soria et al. 2016, pg. 44). We ask a related, but more 136 
specific question, namely "How can we communicate the risks of storm surge to a population that 137 
has never had any experience of such an event?"  138 
 139 
Risk Communication.  140 
The simplest, most basic conceptual framework for risk communication is the  classic “source-141 
receiver” model of risk communication, shown in Figure 2 (Shannon &Weaver, 1949; Witt, 1973; 142 
Shoemaker, 1987).  In this classic model, the goal is  simply to transmit, with as great a degree of 143 
fidelity as possible, a message from originator to recipient.  As considerable research in recent 144 
decades has proven, however, such a model is overly simplistic. Early on, 145 
psychological/psychometric approaches to risk cognition revealed that the way people perceive 146 
risks (which directly affects behavioral response) can be subject to affective elements like dread 147 
or familiarity (Fischhoff et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987; Boholm, 1998), cultural scripts (Rayner & 148 
 8 
Cantor, 1987; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983), and decision heuristics and biases (Kahneman & 149 
Tversky, 1984; Dawes & Kagan, 1988).  Other researchers suggest that people also use mental 150 
models to organize and make sense of technical risk information (Bostrom, Fischhoff & Morgan, 151 
1992; Morgan, 2002).  Much of this literature has focused on the cognitive aspect of risk 152 
communication.  153 
 154 
Perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of risk communication comes from the research on the 155 
social amplification of risk (Kasperson et al., 1988; Renn et al., 1992).  In this literature, risk 156 
communication is mediated by a host of social, cultural, and other processes, which affect how 157 
such communication is received (Pidgeon, Kasperson & Slovic, 2003).  Subsequent models extend 158 
this by further explicating the manifold processes involved. Yet, whereas the literature cited above 159 
has paid more attention to cognitive processes, our research pays closer attention to the 160 
organizational processes that mediate risk communication.  Organizations process information and 161 
meaning through the production of discourse (in text and in speech) that is specific to the 162 
organization (Philips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2004; Weick, 1995).  This motivates us to focus on how 163 
an agency, upon receiving a message (such as a risk signal), then transmits, restates, and 164 
embellishes such information –what the organizational literature has referred to as textualization 165 
(Taylor et al., 1996) and recontextualization (Iedema & Wodak, 1999).   166 
 167 
Our work shares much with the above conceptual frameworks.  Bostrom et al. (2015) also study 168 
the hurricane risk communication pathway.  Morss et al. (2015), similarly, study communication 169 
around flash floods across the entire system (also Lazrus et al., 2015). While these researchers' 170 
emphasis is on the cognitive aspect, inquiring into how different stakeholders understand, interpret, 171 
 9 
and communicate hazards and risks, our emphasis is on the organizational processing of text --i.e., 172 
how organizational routines and cultures affect the communication process.  But clearly, these 173 
aspects are closely related.  As the above researchers note, part of the problem may stem from 174 
discrepancies in how different stakeholders understand technical terms and concepts, such as 175 
"storm surge".  As we discuss below, uncertainty over the meaning of the term storm surge 176 
certainly was an issue in Typhoon Haiyan.  177 
 178 
Figure 3 depicts a model of risk communication that focuses on the organizational processing of 179 
text.  Information, encoded as text6, about risks and hazards are not simply transmitted from agency 180 
to agency; rather, they can undergo mechanisms of processing and translation, as these signals 181 
trigger different organizational routines, resource mobilization activities, and downstream 182 
communication processes within and across a network of agencies.  We will refer to this as the 183 
Textual Processing Model of risk communication. This depiction of organizational processing of 184 
text leads us to concentrate on the following questions:  185 
(i)  Within the organization, does an agency translate risk signals into the local or agency-specific 186 
vernacular (e.g., a disaster risk prevention agency translating a storm surge prediction into 187 
implications for evacuation)?  188 
(ii)  Across organizations, are there effective, functioning feedback loops between agencies that 189 
allow the recipients of a message to verify, clarify, and query the senders about the meaning of the 190 
message?   191 
                                                 
6  For the purpose of this research, we simply define text as language (written, spoken, or digital) 
that is or can be transcribed and transmitted as a document.  Future work can expand the notion 
of text to include other vehicles of meaning, such as action or visual elements (Ricoeur, 1971).  
 10 
iii) To what degree does personal or collective memory of past weather events influence 192 
overstating or understating potential impacts? 193 
 194 
Specifically, we consider how risk communication for an extreme weather event proceeds after 195 
the initial production of technical model output, as was the case with Typhoon Haiyan.  In our 196 
work, we study how an organization further processes the raw technical information.  This means 197 
studying whether or not the information is interpreted --in other words, translated into implications 198 
for the organization (e.g., triggering different emergency procedures into action) or the public (e.g., 199 
evacuation strategies).  We observe whether or not the technical information is translated into 200 
language that is meaningful to different units in an organization (e.g., terms like “forced 201 
evacuation”, “emergency procurement”, “door-to-door patrolling”).  A key question is whether or 202 
not organizational routines take the risk information and further process (or fail to process) this 203 
knowledge into action, and if agencies exhibit sufficient flexibility and responsiveness, so as to 204 
adjust routines to the fit the particular risk situation (e.g., Tompkins, Lemos, & Boyd, 2008).  205 
 206 
Figure 3 illustrates an important aspect to the organizational dimension of risk communication –207 
i.e., signals cross organizational boundaries as they are transmitted from agency to agency.  Is the 208 
signal simply passed on or further translated into terms meaningful to the recipient agency?  For 209 
example, as the weather forecast information is passed on from a central weather bureau to a 210 
risk/disaster management agency, is the information translated into terms that trigger certain risk 211 
prevention or emergency response measures by the receiving organization?  Does the recipient 212 
need further interpretation of what the signal means (e.g., does a 300 kph wind speed imply a 213 
different set of scenarios for the responding agencies)?   214 
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 215 
The literature on boundary processes points to the need for so-called boundary agents who bridge 216 
the organizational divide and manage the translation and exchange of information between 217 
organizations (Guston, 2001; Levina & Vaast, 2005; Lejano & Ingram, 2009) and, more 218 
systemically, chains of boundary organizations or knowledge networks (Feldman and Ingram, 219 
2009; Lemos et al., 2014). And, most critically, disaster risk prevention planning and policy needs 220 
to better incorporate lessons learned from decades of risk communication research.    221 
 222 
In addition, Figure 3 illustrates the necessary functions of feedback loops (shown in the figure as 223 
dashed lines), through which recipient agencies can query, discuss, and exchange knowledge with 224 
the sending agency(s) –what some researchers have referred to as dialogic interaction (Moser, 225 
2009).  Through these feedback mechanisms, parties can exchange tacit, not just formal, 226 
information.  Tacit knowledge can include the most meaningful types of advice that formal 227 
communication often does not convey.  An example of tacit knowledge is when someone tells 228 
another to go beyond formal, routine procedures, or when the degree of uncertainty of a forecast 229 
is great, an agency may advise another to assume a worst-case scenario that goes beyond the 230 
official ‘best estimate’ forecast. Close coordination, which always involves both formal and 231 
informal communication, is a key element in the effective management of extreme events 232 
(Comfort & Zagorecki, 2004; Garnett & Kouzmin, 2007).  233 
 234 
Focusing on the quality of risk communication has become a central concern of weather and 235 
disaster risk reduction agencies in many countries.  The efforts of the U.S. NOAA (National 236 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), and the National Weather Service which is a bureau 237 
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within NOAA, is a prime example, as the agency is trying to reform its communication processes 238 
in the light of the experience of such events as Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy.  New storm 239 
surge risk maps are being implemented beginning in 2016.  Much of the design considerations 240 
revolve around appropriate language, such as the more explicit or vivid description of 241 
consequences (Morss and Hayden, 2010; Ripberger et al., 2015) or the color schemes used in flood 242 
maps (Morrow et al., 2015).  Casteel evaluated trial impact-based warnings used by NWS and 243 
concluded that richer, more explicit communication about the nature of the hazard and its impacts 244 
were effective (Casteel, 2016).  245 
 246 
In the succeeding sections, we focus on these particular organizational phenomena (i.e., inter- and 247 
intra-organizational translation, and the role of organizational routines) in our discussion of risk 248 
communication issues around Typhoon Haiyan.  249 
 250 
[ Insert Figure 2 around here. ] 251 
[ Insert Figure 3 around here. ] 252 
 253 
Methods.  254 
To trace the information pathway, we collected and catalogued artifacts (memoranda, press 255 
releases, and others) of the communication process and interviewed key stakeholders in Metro-256 
Manila and Leyte province, including local mayors, members of the national weather bureau 257 
(Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical, and Astronomical Services Administration, or PAGASA), 258 
managers of the national and local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils 259 
(DRMMCs), and members of the public.   260 
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 261 
The research team traced the risk communication process sequentially, beginning at the initiation 262 
of the message and proceeding down the communication pathway.  This meant starting at the 263 
national weather bureau, PAGASA, which issues the initial storm/weather forecast. as well as the 264 
output of the storm surge and rainfall models.  From there, the team traced the message in 265 
chronological order, proceeding sequentially along succeeding levels down the communication 266 
chain.  The second level consisted of the national disaster risk management agency, NDRRMC 267 
(National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council).  From that point onwards, the 268 
message travels to regional, provincial, city/municipal, and local district (referred to, in the 269 
vernacular, as the barangay) levels in sequence.  The risk communication pathway was pieced 270 
together by interviewing responsible officials at each level and querying each as to the routing of 271 
the communication from their office.  The interviews were conducted in person.  272 
 273 
At each juncture or organization along the pathway, the team collected archival, multi-media 274 
evidence showing formal risk communication products, over a four month period (May to August, 275 
2014) in Metro-Manila (the national capital), as well as Tacloban City and surrounding districts.  276 
For PAGASA, this consisted of the original weather bulletins issued to the public and wired to 277 
lower-level agencies.  Artifacts collected included paper or digital copies of bulletins, press 278 
releases, fax transmittals, meeting minutes, email messages, as well as digital files consisting of 279 
video and audio recordings of press releases, agency briefings, and radio/TV broadcasts.   280 
 281 
To gain further knowledge of the risk communication process during Typhoon Haiyan, agency 282 
staff were interviewed. We conducted 28  interviews with officials, which were digitally recorded, 283 
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transcribed, translated into English from the local languages (Tagalog and Bisaya), and then 284 
thematically analyzed. Table 1 summarizes the 28 interviews, of which 6 were at the national, 3 at 285 
the provincial, 14 at the municipal, and 5 at the local district levels, respectively.  Subjects were 286 
recruited by identifying responsible officials in each agency who were tasked with sending or 287 
receiving communication regarding the storm event. All of the persons contacted agreed to be 288 
interviewed. The interviews began about five months after Typhoon Haiyan. The interviews 289 
employed an initial, unstructured open-ended segment, combined with a semi-structured portion 290 
involving a series of standard questions.  The open-ended segment consisted of asking each 291 
informant to provide an account of the risk communication process conducted by their agency, the 292 
different message received and sent, along with the media used for sending these messages.  The 293 
semi-structured portion consisted of asking relatively standardized questions around the risk 294 
communication process.  295 
 296 
Each interview was initiated with providing information and obtaining consent, including 297 
permission to digitally record the interview.  Interview recordings were subsequently transcribed 298 
for analysis.  Analysis consisted of thematic classification, wherein the analyst would read the 299 
transcript and highlight key passages that corresponded to the above themes.  Table 1 summarizes 300 
important themes found in each interview (with an explanation of the themes found in the table 301 
footnote).  302 
 303 
Two researchers reviewed two of the transcripts and conducted thematic analysis independently 304 
to verify inter-coder reliability, which the team judged to be adequate (Krippendorph alpha of 305 
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0.72).  In the analysis below, quotes are English translations, the original text often including 306 
combinations of several languages (Tagalog, Bisaya, and English).  307 
 308 
[  Insert Table 1 around here. ] 309 
Results and Discussion.  310 
It is often the case, as in the Philippines, that already advanced weather forecasting and surge 311 
modeling capabilities are not matched by equally effective communication practices.  We found 312 
that crucial processes of translation and feedback were often inadequate in the case of Typhoon 313 
Haiyan.  We reconstructed the essential communication pathway, as depicted in Figure 4, 314 
beginning with the national weather agency, PAGASA, and continuing on down to line agencies 315 
and local governments.  Both the archival material and interviews showed that the flow of 316 
information was mostly linear and unidirectional, very much corresponding to the pathway shown 317 
in Figure 4.  318 
 319 
[ Insert Figure 4 around here. ] 320 
 321 
The archival information was aggregated to assess how the risk information, specifically focusing 322 
on the storm surge model prediction, was transmitted down the communication pathway.  Figure 323 
5 shows the weather bulletin issued by the national weather agency, PAGASA. The storm surge 324 
information is shown as a minor line item yet this event was the most damaging component of the 325 
typhoon.  At points farther down the communication pathway (e.g. at the provincial or municipal 326 
level), we found the message to be essentially a copy of the original. Or, the line agency would 327 
issue a cover memo, summarizing information in the accompanying PAGASA bulletin but not 328 
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embellishing or interpreting it.  For example, the next agency down the risk communication chain, 329 
NDRRMC, simply retransmits the same PAGASA bulletin and prepares a shorter summary 330 
information sheet (Figure 6).  NDRRMC does not add or develop the information in the original 331 
PAGASA bulletin. The next level down in the chain is the regional agency, which retransmits the 332 
original PAGASA bulletin and prepares its own summary weather advisory (Figure 7).  The latter, 333 
in fact, contains sparse information, leaving out mention of the storm surge and, instead, warning 334 
residents in low-lying areas of possible flooding.  This communication is received by the provincial 335 
government which, in turn, issues a memo to municipal governments and mayors (Figure 8).  As 336 
seen in Figure 8, the memo only mentions "possible flash floods and storm surges" without giving 337 
any additional information.   338 
 339 
[ Insert Figure 5 around here. ] 340 
[ Insert Figure 6 around here. ] 341 
[ Insert Figure 7 around here. ] 342 
[ Insert Figure 8 around here. ] 343 
 344 
The interviews revealed that communication from the regional to the local (city, municipal, 345 
barangay) levels were often verbal (through telephone calls), since participants said that many 346 
local government offices (especially at the barangay levels) do not have fax machines or reliable 347 
internet connections. As the informants described, they would have the PAGASA/NDRRMC 348 
advisories in front of them and translate these into the local language (e.g. Waray) while talking 349 
to the recipients. It is the same process of automatic translation that PAGASA officials at the 350 
regional level said they employed when they read the advisories to give the public updates over 351 
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the radio.  PAGASA's bulletins had but general geographic information to begin with, but the 352 
bigger issue seems to be non-embellishment, by provincial and local agencies, of the message with 353 
more locally relevant information. In other words, there was little processing of the national agency 354 
advisories into more descriptive, contextual, or explanatory text.  355 
 356 
These and other organizational 'rigidities' proved to be a key problem in the communication 357 
process.  The main findings of our research are as follows.   358 
 359 
1.   Routine, pro forma text fails to transmit meaningful knowledge about singular and 360 
extraordinary events.  361 
In the case of Typhoon Haiyan, the weather bureau, PAGASA, kept to conventional routine, 362 
classifying the storm using its conventional classification scheme, typhoon signal #4, and to “copy 363 
and paste” standard text corresponding to that classification in subsequent communication (Figure 364 
4).  The bulletin’s text listing projected impacts was standard, pro forma language for any signal 365 
#4 event.  The result was the inability to convey information that was distinct from conventional 366 
storm-related information regularly received by the public (necessarily distinct, because of the 367 
unprecedented nature of the storm surge risk). Such text inadequately communicated how Typhoon 368 
Haiyan would be different from what officials and residents had ever experienced in the past, 369 
especially with regard to the storm surge.  As shown in Figure 4, the modeled storm surge 370 
prediction was simply included as a single line of text at the bottom of the weather forecast: a 371 
routine, conventional message, as discussed above. Apart from transmitting formal model output, 372 
this routine text did not attempt to translate information into meaningful, explicit, and vivid terms 373 
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(e.g., "all wooden structures likely to be swept away") that could spur action geared around the 374 
ensuing storm surge.   375 
 376 
2.  The lack of processes of organizational translation resulted in a failure to communicate the 377 
severity of risk and the real significance of the storm surge prediction.   378 
By ‘organizational translation’, we refer to the restatement, explanation, or embellishment of the 379 
technical information so that recipients fully understand what it means and what actions are 380 
warranted.  There was no additional, accompanying explanation that interpreted, for agencies and 381 
citizens outside the weather bureau, what the data bulletin and storm surge model output meant. 382 
The only translation that occurred was conversion of the English text to the local vernacular, but 383 
little or no additional explanation was attempted by any of the agencies, as the official 384 
communication from PAGASA was treated as a formal, legal/technical document.  Examination 385 
of documents from lower-level agencies revealed that what these agencies did, essentially, was to 386 
simply copy or report verbatim, in their own communications, the weather bureau’s (PAGASA’s) 387 
originating bulletin without comment or exposition.   388 
 389 
When asked why they did not embellish or interpret the storm surge and other items in the bulletin, 390 
the disaster management agency official said: “PAGASA says, 'We are the only ones with the 391 
authority to announce such information (interpreting) the weather condition.' If you put out your 392 
own information, that’s not official.” On the other hand, when asked the same question, the 393 
PAGASA officer replied: “We don’t do that (give advice).  We are just in charge of creating 394 
warning bulletins… we are the warning agency… We don’t interpret the bulletins… But if they 395 
ask for advice, maybe we can give advice.” 396 
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 397 
This resulted in the absence of interpretation as to what the forecasts meant in real, concrete terms. 398 
It was evident from multiple interviews that there was a critical gap in communication, especially 399 
that between the national weather bureau, which saw its mission as limited to the rote transmission 400 
of modeled forecast output, and the agencies down the line which chose not to engage in 401 
interpretation/translation of the official forecasts into terms that would be meaningful to local 402 
actors.  This is one important reason that the fragment of text, indicating a storm surge of up to 7 403 
meters, located at the bottom of the bulletin, aroused inadequate concern and insufficient action.    404 
 405 
This also contributed to the lack of responsive, reflexive action around the storm surge prediction.  406 
For example, one informant from the local disaster management agency said that there was no 407 
modification of the conventional evacuation routines in response to the risk of storm surge.  408 
Evacuation centers along the coast were utilized as before.  409 
 410 
The weather and disaster management agency staff also displayed a relatively circumscribed, 411 
technical understanding of what constituted valid knowledge and expert advice. Interviewees 412 
generally acknowledged that more definite advice might have been given to coastal communities.  413 
But several of them thought that, unless the storm surge model became more sophisticated and 414 
precise in its modeling capabilities, such that it would pinpoint which communities would or would 415 
not be inundated, and to which depths –that they should not offer any additional advice.  This 416 
coheres with the classic Weberian notion of expert agencies which confine their expertise to the 417 
narrowest, technical domains, where staff are highly risk-averse vis-à-vis overstepping their 418 
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bounds. The interviews indicated an ever-present  fear of triggering a false alarm, echoing findings 419 
in the literature (Dow and Cutter, 1998). 420 
 421 
3.  Highly routinized and hierarchical lines of communication prevented the transmission of tacit 422 
knowledge, the latter being needed to guide action.   423 
The communication process consisted of simply passing on the same copy text down the chain of 424 
command, without embellishment, addition, or explanation.  The communication was largely 425 
formal and linear, not allowing for other forums (informal or otherwise) that would allow the 426 
transmission of tacit knowledge.  Tacit knowledge is what is sought when someone asks a question 427 
like: “We see reference to model output indicating a 7 meter surge, but what does this really 428 
mean?” 429 
 430 
Multiple interviews revealed how routinized and strongly hierarchical the chain of communication 431 
was.  When we asked the local PAGASA team in Tacloban City, why they stayed in their nearshore 432 
office despite the storm surge prediction, the answers were: they were never told by superiors that 433 
they could leave the office, and the forecast seemed on the surface to be the same conventional 434 
message for category four typhoons, with which they were familiar.  When asked why they did 435 
not leave the office, the response was: “That [decision] has to come from the central office”.  In 436 
explaining their inattention to the storm surge prediction, the local agency informant said: 437 
“Concerning the storm surge, if you imagine the bulletin, the storm surge item appears at the 438 
bottom of every bulletin. Every bulletin will have it –regardless of whether it is a depression, storm, 439 
or typhoon.  Even a depression will have a storm surge notice… so we did not focus on that and 440 
instead focused on the extraordinary strength [wind velocity] of the typhoon.” They did not ask 441 
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higher-level agency members what the storm surge prediction meant in their particular situation. 442 
This proved tragic, as of the four on-duty officers at that station, only three survived.   443 
 444 
We interviewed communication officers from both PAGASA and NDRRMC who might 445 
conceivably act as boundary agents, responsible for translating messages into meaningful terms.  446 
What we found was the inadequate organizational translation across agency boundaries.  When we 447 
asked the central office of the weather agency why they did not highlight, expound on, or further 448 
explain the storm surge information (e.g., telling nearshore personnel that their offices would be 449 
inundated), the response was that of compartmentalized agency functions.  “We (PAGASA central 450 
office) merely report the model results.  It’s the job of the local officials to interpret the data.”  In 451 
short, interpreting and enhancing the message never occurred.  There was never a translation of 452 
the storm surge model output into a meaningful message (e.g., “Nearshore stations should move 453 
operations to offices on higher ground.”).  On the other hand, when we interviewed the disaster 454 
management agency (NDRRMC), the response was that their duty did not include interpretation 455 
of weather forecasts, simply receiving (and forwarding) it as transmitted.  Organizational cultures 456 
that do not foster a sense of agency among bureau staff—the capacity of staff to act in an 457 
autonomous, responsive manner (Bovens & Hart, 1996)—were also implicated as part of the 458 
inadequate risk communication process.  459 
 460 
4.  Missing or non-functioning feedback loops resulted in a failure to transmit tacit knowledge.  461 
Not only did routinized communication processes fail to translate risk signals into meaningful and 462 
actionable knowledge, but feedback loops --which might have been used to query message senders 463 
about the meaning of the risk signal-- were not effectively utilized.  464 
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 465 
The absence or non-activation of feedback loops, allowing even informal communication from 466 
lower to higher-level agencies, and between citizens and local agencies, was serious. Analysis of 467 
records and recollections of even informal briefing meetings showed that transmission of 468 
information was formal and unidirectional (i.e., officials transmitting unembellished forecast 469 
information downwards).  When asked why the weather bureau did not explain, to lower-level 470 
agencies and the public what a 7 meter storm surge meant in real terms, the manager from the 471 
national PAGASA central office said that the agency was only responsible for issuing the official 472 
forecast, and that they volunteered additional advice only when asked.  But as another PAGASA 473 
official admitted: “…Because no one had asked (for explanation about the storm surge), and 474 
everyone (in the agencies) became busy, there was no more communication.”  475 
 476 
As an example of the overly hierarchical, non-deliberative nature of risk communication, in a pre-477 
event meeting in Tacloban, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government 478 
informed local agencies that they had until 10:00 a.m. the following morning to complete 479 
evacuations. Local personnel, who were aware that the most recent forecast actually predicted the 480 
typhoon’s landfall in the early morning hours, chose not to correct the secretary. As one of the risk 481 
management officers confided, “I could not say anything because the people in the meeting were 482 
all higher-ups. They might say, ‘Who are you?’ ” According to one local mayor, this 483 
communication failure may have contributed to the large number of casualties.   484 
 485 
5.  Lacking meaningful, non-routinized risk communication, officials and residents resorted to 486 
‘common sense’, drawing from personal experience, which can fail during singular events.   487 
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Local pre-emptive procedures involved conventional measures corresponding to a signal # 4 storm 488 
(on PAGASA’s scale).  This included evacuating residents to centers, some of which were located 489 
near the shoreline.  Most of the interviews with agency personnel revealed that, since there was a 490 
lack of clarity regarding what the official bulletins meant regarding level of hazard (especially the 491 
storm surge), most relied on their common sense, which meant drawing from their store of personal 492 
experiences.  But, as one of the local agency officials said: “Nothing prepared us for what hit… 493 
you cannot visualize what they mean when they predict a storm surge, so you just use your 494 
common sense…” However, as the manager of the disaster agency said: “This was beyond 495 
expectation… (and) preparation was not sufficient.” In short, there was no communication about 496 
the inadequacy of conventional procedures and, for all of those involved, this was a singular event 497 
for which there was no personal or institutional memory to draw from.  498 
 499 
As one local mayor said, “The general understanding, when you say ‘a storm surge’, is that the 500 
water rises, but it does not travel like a tsunami and knock everything down in its way. We’ve had 501 
storm surges before, and the water would just rise… this time, the water receded 200 meters then 502 
got thrown back at the town…” Other investigators also implicate the lack of familiarity with the 503 
term, storm surge (Chen, Areddy, and Hookway, 2013).  504 
 505 
Speaking to the notion of collective “common sense”, a few of the interviewees talked about 506 
possibly improved communication if PAGASA had used the term, “tsunami” instead of “storm 507 
surge”, but then quickly added that to modify language in this way would be out of bounds for 508 
them professionally.  It is evident that the problem lies not just in the terminologies used (de Bruin 509 
 24 
& Bostrom, 2013), but in the organizational cultures that could not function outside routinized pro 510 
forma communications.   511 
  512 
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Conclusion. 513 
While agency capacities for weather forecasting and storm surge modeling may already be 514 
extensive, processes for communicating such knowledge may not be as developed.  Our focus on 515 
the organizational processing of risk information, paying close attention to message 516 
translation/intepretation and boundary exchange, has revealed important ways in which risk 517 
communication around Typhoon Haiyan was deficient. It is impossible to judge how different 518 
organizational cultures and routines might have changed the outcome.  It is possible that a typhoon 519 
of this unprecedented magnitude might have caused the destruction that it did regardless of any 520 
changes in agency routines. However, our research indicates that in the case of Typhoon Haiyan, 521 
the routine transmission of technical information failed to convey knowledge that the oncoming 522 
typhoon would be a non-routine event requiring unprecedented actions (Lejano, Tan, and Wilson, 523 
2015).  524 
 525 
Furthermore, the provision of a standard message, from which none deviate, needs revision.  526 
Rather, communication to more local agents needs to be more contextualized and personalized.  527 
By contextualized, we mean translating the message to implications for the local community (in 528 
the Philippines, this corresponds to the smallest unit of government, which is the barangay).  Maps 529 
and text should be crafted that pertains directly to each locale.  Messages should be addressed to 530 
the community/barangay, perhaps in many cases, delivered door-to-door.  This increases the 531 
likelihood that the recipients understand the message to be immediately relevant to themselves.  532 
Hotlines should be established whereby local agencies or community members can call and inquire 533 
into the nature of the event directly, within a conversation that is not merely unidirectional. The 534 
presence of lines of communication entails what we call boundary agents --PAGASA or other 535 
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agency staff who are trained to field formal or informal queries from multiple publics and who are 536 
empowered to deviate from a script.  Yet another possible way to increase the local relevance of 537 
the messages is to designate different zones in a local neighborhood and to send messages 538 
regarding which zones are at high risk.  These are just some of the ways to interpret risk 539 
information in ways relevant to the recipient.  540 
 541 
On the other hand, when agencies simply copy and recopy the same stock message, the recipient 542 
sees only a script --i.e., a routine message to which she/he need not pay any special attention.  Rote 543 
transmission and retransmission of a scripted pro-forma text can give the public a (misleading) 544 
signal that it is all merely a ritual.  545 
 546 
Our interviews revealed a deep reluctance on the part of agency personnel to interpret official data 547 
and translate it in terms most immediately meaningful to the public and local officials.  One 548 
interviewee thought that, unless and until the storm surge model output was sophisticated enough 549 
to pinpoint the specific areas where very high wave heights would be experienced, they would not 550 
be able to tell the public anything different than what was communicated during Typhoon Haiyan. 551 
The research implicates the stifling effect of organizational routines and agency boundaries.  552 
Another problem, vis-à-vis the mere recording of storm surge model output into agency bulletins, 553 
is what the public policy literature has referred to as the rigid textualization of policy (Lejano and 554 
Park, 2015).  In this case, the problem lies in the hesitance of agency personnel to go beyond the 555 
formal agency text and the routine transmission of technical information.   556 
 557 
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This speaks to the need to evaluate organizational routines.  Organizational cultures are strongly 558 
implicated.  More than anything, there is a greater need for empowerment of bureau staff to go 559 
beyond rigid routines and tailor their messages to the recipient.  They need to be encouraged to 560 
facilitate two-way exchanges between message sender and recipient, allowing the transfer of tacit, 561 
unofficial information without threat of official sanction for informal communication.  Risk 562 
communication needs to go beyond formal, repetitive routines to a more relational, contextualized 563 
exchange (Lejano, 2008).  We alluded to a linguistic turn in risk communication --consistent with 564 
this, perhaps we can think of risk communication as narration and each actor as a narrator.  565 
Narratives need to be plurivocal, wherein the narrator can freely tell the story (which can be the 566 
same basic story as everyone else's) but in varying ways depending on the context within which 567 
she or he is communicating (Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram, 2013).  568 
 569 
While our conceptual model draws upon previous frameworks such as that of the Social 570 
Amplification of Risk and Mental Models research, we place a greater emphasis on the processing 571 
of language within and across organizations and the effect of organizational routines on these 572 
processes.  We hope that our work becomes part of a 'linguistic turn' in the research on 573 
communicating risks and hazards.  We posit that active interpretation and embellishment of the 574 
original messages from the central weather agency should be cast in various forms that are easier 575 
for local agencies and the public to interpret.  Specifically, we would imagine that an effective 576 
process would contextualize, personalize, and more vividly describe risks as the message is 577 
coursed to more local recipients.  In the case of Typhoon Haiyan, we found, at numerous points, a 578 
type of organizational rigidity that consigned agency staff to simply duplicating official weather 579 
bulletins in their communications. 580 
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 581 
There should be a concerted approach to identify, through reflective everyday practice but also 582 
periodic program evaluation, bottlenecks in the effective use of forecast model output.  The 583 
literature is clear on the need to focus more closely on organizational capacities, inter-584 
organizational coordination, and communication (Birkmann & von Teichman, 2010; Serrao-585 
Neumann et al., 2015; Oppenheimer et al, 2015).  Agents need to actively process risk information, 586 
translating it into terms relevant to the recipient agencies and the public.  Calling to mind Lyotard's 587 
notion of a narrative community, risk communication should involve multiple policy actors, each 588 
telling the story in their own ways (Lyotard, 1984).  Future work will build upon this Textual 589 
Processing Model of risk communication.  590 
 591 
While being critical of communication process, we do not lose sight of the professionalism and 592 
extraordinary dedication of agency personnel and local government staff in the Philippines, some 593 
of whom lost their lives while performing their duties. The problem, as we see it, is institutional, 594 
having to do with agency routines that need to be reflected upon and reformed.  595 
 596 
How should governments and media communicate the risks due to events that lie outside a region’s 597 
collective memory (Leiserowitz, 2006; Fischhoff & Davis, 2014)?  One thing is clear: 598 
unidirectional lines of communication and organizational rigidities need to change, allowing 599 
flexible, contingent responses when circumstances are beyond the norm.  600 
  601 
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